Abstract: Mix networks are designed to provide anonymity for users in a variety of applications, including privacy-preserving WWW browsing and numerous e-commerce systems. Such networks have been shown to be susceptible to a number of statistical traffic analysis attacks. Among these are flow correlation attacks, where an adversary may disclose the communication relationship between a sender and a receiver by measuring the similarity between the sender's outbound flow and the receiver's inbound flow. The effectiveness of the attacks is measured in terms of the probability that an adversary correctly recognises the receiver. This paper describes a model for the flow correlation attack effectiveness. Our results illustrate the quantitative relationship among system parameters such as sample size, noise level, payload flow rate and attack effectiveness. Our analysis quantitatively reveals how, under certain situations, existing flow-based anonymous systems would fail under flow-correlation attacks, thus providing useful guidelines for the design of future anonymous systems.
Introduction
In this paper, we describe a framework for the analytical evaluation of mix networks under a special class of statistical traffic analysis attacks. We focus our attention on the effectiveness of mix networks under flow-correlation attacks.
Anonymity has become necessary and legitimate in many scenarios, such as anonymous web browsing, e-voting, e-banking, e-commerce and e-auctions. In each of these scenarios, encryption alone cannot achieve the anonymity required by participants (Sun et al., 2002) .
Since Chaum (1981) pioneered the basic idea of the anonymous communication system, referred to as mixes, researchers have developed various anonymity systems for different applications. A significant amount of effort has been applied to researching anonymous communications, and many analytical results are available in the literature. Nevertheless, much work remains to be done to assess such systems in real-life settings, that is, with widely deployed applications and protocols.
In this paper, we propose an analytical evaluation of mix networks under approximations to realistic traffic.
We focus our study on a representative type of statistical flow-based timing attack against mix networks: the so-called flow-correlation attack (Zhu et al., 2004) . In this type of attack, an adversary attempts to reconstruct the path of the communication flow through the mix network from the sender to the receiver. This is done by estimating how mixes in the network route the flow. If sufficient data is available from all the links in the mix network, this path reconstruction can be done on a mix-by-mix basis all the way to the suspected receiver(s). If data are available from a subset of links only, mixes can be considered to be aggregated into supermixes and the path construction can be done at supermix level. In the extreme case when data are available from the edges of the mix network only, the entire mix network has to be treated as a single, big supermix.
In all these cases, the basic building block of the flow correlation attack can be described as follows: given timing data of a flow at the input of a mix or supermix (for brevity we will use the term of 'mix' to denote mixes and supermixes in the following), and timing of aggregated traffic leaving the mix at each outgoing link (the number of outgoing links can be quite large in the case of supermixes), what is the link taken by the flow? We previously illustrated the effectiveness of the flow correlation attack empirically for the case of single mixes (Zhu et al., 2004 ). We will show in Section 5.1 that it is very effective for mix networks as well.
Our major contributions are summarised as follows:
1 We propose a general modelling framework for mix networks, based on the detection rate, that is, probability that an adversary correctly identifies the path taken by a flow at the output of a mix (or mix network). Our modelling framework is sufficiently generic to determine the performance of mix networks with various mixing strategies and payload flows.
2 We formally prove that: for any mix network, an adversary can achieve an arbitrarily high effectiveness as long as sufficient traffic data is available. This result is independent of the traffic characteristics (TCP or UDP).
3 Finally, for the special case of a single mix, we show how our models allow an accurate prediction of the attack effectiveness as a function of the amount of available data to the adversary. Our analytical methodology helps to establish useful guidelines for the design of future anonymous systems.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 outlines our mix network model, batching strategies used by existing mix networks and threat model. In Section 4, after formally defining the problem of flow-correlation attack, we derive the theorem on the calculation of detection rate.
In Section 5, we use simulation experiments to validate the accuracy of analytical results and evaluate system performance in terms of detection rate and minimum sample size. We conclude this paper in Section 6 and briefly consider future work.
Related work
For anonymous e-mail applications, Chaum (1981) proposed to use special relay servers, that is, mixes, to reroute messages, which are encrypted by public keys of mixes. In order to remove the packet-level correlation between its input and output messages, a mix batches and reorders input messages before sending them out. Message-level evolutions of Chaum's mix were Helsingius' first Internet anonymous remailer (Helsingius, 1996) , Eric Hughes and Hal Finney's cypherpunk remailer (discussed in Parekh, 1996) , and Gülcü and Tsudik's, 1996 Babel. Möller and Cottrell (2000) developed Mixmaster, which counters a global passive attack by using message padding and also counters trickle and flood attacks (Gülcü and Tsudik, 1996; Serjantov et al., 2002) by using a pool batching strategy. Danezis et al. (2003) developed Mixminion, the design of which considers a comprehensive set of attacks proposed by researchers.
Message-based mix networks have been extended for e-mail applications to flow-based anonymous communication network. Flow-based mixes operate at a per-packet (instead of per-message) level. Such mixes are either organised as core mix networks such as in Tor (Dingledine et al., 2004) , Onion routing (Syverson et al., 1997) and Freedom (Boucher et al., 2000) or peer-to-peer networks such as in Crowds 1 (Reiter and Rubin, 1998) , Tarzan (Freedman and Morris, 2002) and P 5 (Sherwood et al., 2002) . This paper is interested in the study of passive traffic analysis attacks against low-latency 2 anonymous communication systems. In Hintz, (2002) , Sun et al. (2002) , a quantitative performance analysis is given for an anonymous web server that applies both encryption and anonymising proxies. The analysis takes advantage of the fact that a number of HTTP features, such as the number and size of objects, can be used as signatures to identify web pages with some accuracy. Unless an anonymiser addresses this issue, these signatures are visible to the adversary. Serjantov and Sewell (2003) analysed the possibility of a lone flow along an input link of a mix in peer-to-peer anonymity systems. If the rate of this lone input flow is approximately equal to the rate of a flow out of the mix, this pair of input and output flows are correlated. They also discussed possible traffic features used to trace a flow. Other analysis focus on the anonymity degradation when some mixes are compromised, (e.g. Reiter and Rubin, 1998) .
To find if Bob is communicating with Alice through a flow-based mix network, an adversary may measure the similarity between Bob's outbound traffic and Alice's inbound traffic to the mix. In a previous study (Zhu et al., 2004) , we proposed using mutual information for the similarity measurement. In the single-mix case, an adversary collects samples from an input flow and each output flow of the mix. Each sample is divided into multiple equally sized segments based on time. The number of packets in each segment is counted and forms a time series of packet counts.
Then the adversary chooses the output link whose flow's packet count time series has the biggest mutual information with the input flow's packet count time series as the input flow's output link. To counter such attacks, we proposed the use of adaptive padding, in which the output flows of a mix are synchronised and packets to different output links are sent in a predefined order. If there is no packet to an output link and a deadline is passed, dummy packets are generated for that output link. Levine et al. (2004) describe an approach to discover whether Bob is communicating with Alice. In their particular case, they have access to per-flow packet data. This is the case, for example, when the attacker has access to the unprotected flows entering and leaving the mix network. Similarly, the mixes at the two ends of the flow may be controlled by the attacker. Given this information, the attacker can use cross correlation to measure the similarity between individual flows. In comparison, the flow correlation attack described by Zhu et al. (2004) attempts to identify the path of a flow across one or more non-compromised mixes. In order to do this, the attack must identify a flow within an aggregate of mixed flows. As a result, a successful flow correlation attack not only detects the sender and receiver of a specific flow, but also be used to reveal the path taken by the specific flow in the mix network. Danezis (2004) describes an attack on the Continuous Mix: in such a mix packets get individually delayed according to some probability distribution. Since the packet delays are independent, the departure distribution of the packets of a flow can be accurately described (if one ignores queuing) by convoluting the packet-arrival and the delay distribution. This can be used as a basis for measuring similarities among flows.
In this paper, we focus on mix-based (or more generally rerouting-based) anonymity systems. Other anonymity systems have been described in the literature: broadcast tree systems, for example, hide the sender-receiver relation by multicasting the flow data to the receiver, in addition to several 'dummy' receivers. A complete different approach is taken in DC networks (see Chaum, 1998) where each participant shares secret coin flips with other pairs and announce the parity of the observed flip to all other participants and to the receiver. The total parity should be even, since each flip is announced twice. By incorrectly stating the parity the sender has seen, this causes the parity to be odd. Thus the sender can send a message to the receiver. The receiver gets the message if it finds the parity to be odd. Nobody except the sender knows who sent the message. This scheme replies on an underlying broadcast medium, which comes at a great expense as the number of participants grows. Due to this lack of scalability none of the currently deployed systems employs this method. In the following, we will focus on rerouting-based systems.
Models

Mixes and mix networks
A mix is a relay device for anonymous communication. Figure 1 (a) shows a network where hosts communicate among each other by way of a mix. A single-mix network can achieve a certain level of communication anonymity: The sender of a message attaches the receiver address to a packet and encrypts it using the mix's public key. Upon receiving a packet, the mix decodes the packet using its private key. Different from an ordinary router, a mix usually will not relay the received packet immediately. Rather, it collects several packets and then sends them out in a batch. The order of packets may be altered as well. Both batching and reordering techniques are necessary in order to prevent timing-based attacks. Without batching and reordering, a simple timing correlation of packets collected at the input and output links may break the anonymity that the mix tries to maintain.
As shown in Figure 1 (b), typically, mixes are deployed as mix networks, which are connected through overlays. Mix networks have the benefit that they generally continue providing some level of anonymity even in the presence of compromised mixes. In this paper, we will concentrate on the analysis of mixes and of supermixes that consist of potentially large number of mixes. We will describe the effectiveness of mix networks in Section 5.1 and discuss extensions of the analysis in Section 6.
Batching strategies
Batching strategies are designed to prevent not only simple timing analysis attacks, but also powerful trickle attacks, flood attacks and many other forms of attacks (Danezis et al., 2003; Serjantov et al., 2002 Serjantov et al., ). serjantov et al. (2002 summarises seven batching strategies that have been proposed. These seven batching strategies are listed in Table 1 .
In Table 1 , batching strategies from S 1 to S 4 are denoted as simple mix, while batching strategies from S 5 to S 7 are denoted as pool mixes. From Table 1 , we can see that the transmission of a batch of packets can be triggered by different events, for example, queue length reaching a predefined threshold, a timer having a time out or some combination of these two.
Flow-based mix networks can also use stop-and-go and similar mixing strategies (Danezis, 2004; Kesdogan et al., 1998) . In such strategies, individual packets are each assigned a delay, based on a probability distribution. Consequently, the packets in a flow are reordered and anonymity is maintained.
The goal of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework to evaluate the effectiveness of batching mix strategies Threshold and timed mix < m, t > A timer times out every t seconds. When both the timer has timed out and the queue length has been no less than m, send all packets in the queue S 5
Threshold pool mix < m, g > When the queue length equals to m + g, send m packets randomly chosen from the queue S 6 Timed pool mix < t, g > A timer times out every t seconds. When the timer times out and (n > g), send n − g packets randomly chosen from the queue S 7
Timed dynamic-pool mix < m, t, g, p > A timer times out every t seconds. When the timer times out and (n ≥ m + g), send max(1, p(n − g) ) r packets randomly chosen from the queue Note: n -queue size; m -threshold to control the packet sending; t -timer's period if a timer is used; g -the minimum number of packets left in the pool for pool Mixes; p -a fraction only used in timed dynamic-pool mix.
for flow-based mix networks against a class of powerful flow-based timing attacks.
Threat model
An adversary may have many ways to attack a flow-based mix network (Danezis, 2004; Dingledine et al., 2004; Serjantov and Sewell, 2003) . Researchers have previously paid attention to packet-level timing attacks. In this paper, we will demonstrate that flow-level timing correlation attacks pose a much more serious threat to mix networks. We assume a passive adversary, whose capability is summarised as follows:
1 The adversary is passive: she/he observes input and output links of a mix, collects the packet interarrival times and analyses them. Since traffic is not actively altered (by, say, dropping, inserting and/or modifying packets during a communication session), this kind of attack is difficult to detect. It can be easily staged on wired and wireless links (Howard, 1997) by a variety of agents, such as malicious ISPs or other interested entities (FBI, 2003) .
2 The attacker is global: she/he can observe all the links of the mix network. Whenever links are beyond her reach, we treat that portion of the mix network as a super mix.
3 The mix's infrastructure is at least partly known to the adversary. The details of the mix batching strategies need not be known (we will make use of knowledge about mix's operation when we generate the models of mix effectiveness in the following sections).
4 The adversary cannot correlate a packet on an input link to another packet on an output link based on content or on size. The former is prevented by encryption and the latter by packet padding, respectively. We evaluate how well the attacker can statistically correlate flows based on timing despite the batching in the mix.
5 In this paper, we do not consider explicit link padding with dummy packets. However, the network carries cross traffic that: a acts as naturally occurring 'dummy' traffic and b adds to the timing perturbance through queuing and congestion in switches, routers, and mixes.
Also, we assume that there is no fragmentation of packets. The mix network is not using multipath routing. That is, all packets of a flow are routed along the same path. The analysis in this paper gives guideline to trade-off flow duration versus anonymity.
6 Finally, we assume that the specific objective of the adversary is to identify the output link of a traffic flow that appears on an input link. Others have described similar attacks, but under simplified circumstances. Serjantov and Swell (2003) , for example, assume that the flow under attack appears alone both on an input link and an output link of a mix, thus making its traffic characteristics immediately visible to the attacker.
Estimating detection rate
In this section, we will first describe flow-correlation attacks and then analyse their performance in terms of detection rate.
Flow correlation
Problem Definition
Define a traffic flow as a series of packets exchanged between a sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob) in the network. 3 For the attacker who reconstructs the path of a flow, a fundamental question must be answered: given a flow, f , into a mix or mix network, which output link does the flow take? For example, consider the simplified scenario in Figure 2 , where f , c 1 ,…, c 4 are output flows of input flows f , c 1 ,…, c 4 , respectively. The goal of the adversary is to determine whether input flow f , after passing through the mix, goes through link
Flow f is not alone in the mix network: Firstly, it is typically not alone on the input link to the mix. Secondly, significant cross traffic either naturally exists or is generated by the mix network. We therefore have to assume that there is cross traffic (e.g. denoted by c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , and c 4 in Figure 2 ) interfering with the correlation analysis. In the experiments, we will focus on scenarios where long-term average traffic rates on all the output links (e.g. link M→R 1 and link M→R 2 in Figure 2 ) are identical. This renders simple statistical attacks, such as average traffic rate based attacks by Serjantov and Sewell (2003) , invalid. In this section, we will always use the set-up of Figure 2 as an example to demonstrate our analysis technique. 
Flow-Correlation Attack Algorithm
To determine which output link the input flow f uses, an adversary has to collect information and make a determination based on some statistical analysis. In this paper, we consider the case where the adversary adopts a method based on mutual information (Zhu et al., 2004) of the input flow and the aggregate flows on each output link and chooses the output link whose aggregated flow has the biggest mutual information with the input flow. Specifically, using Figure 2 as the example, the adversary will collect a traffic sample from both input and output links. Then, he/she calculates mutual information I (f, l M→R 1 ) and I (f, l M→R 2 ), where l M→R 1 = f + c 1 + c 4 is the aggregated flow on link M→R 1 and l M→R 2 = c 2 + c 3 is the aggregated flow on link M→R 2 . A decision will then be made in the following way:
, the adversary will declare link M→R 1 as f 's output link. Otherwise, link M→R 2 will be chosen.
The rationale for comparing mutual information is that the correct output link carries the flow, embedded in cross traffic: the input flow and the aggregate output flow are therefore not independent and thus display a non-zero mutual information. In Figure 2 , it is statistically likely that input flow f is more similar to the aggregated flow l M→R 1 on link M→R 1 than the aggregated flow l M→R 2 on link M→R 2 since f is in l M→R 1 . 
Mutual information estimation
From the discussion above, we can see that an accurate estimation of mutual information of input and output traffic is critical in flow-correlation attacks.
We assume that the adversary uses the following packet counting scheme to estimate the mutual information between the input flow f and any aggregated flow l on an output link:
1 The adversary collects (by, say, sniffing) a sample of traffic traces of the input flow f and the aggregated flow l.
2 Each traffic trace is divided into segments. The length of the segments is equal to T seconds, which is denoted as sampling interval. The number of the segments in a trace is denoted N and is called sample size in this paper. 
4 Based on the time series f T and l T , a joint time series can be developed as follows:
where a i and b i are elements in time series of f T and l T , respectively.
5 Finally, the mutual information of the input flow and the output link flow can be estimated by the following formula:
wherep ( 
Derivation of the detection rate
The detection rate v measures the effectiveness of the attack and is defined as the probability that the adversary correctly recognises the output link of the input flow f . Without loss of generality, we assume that the input flow f uses the mix's first output link that is, link M→R 1 . Based on the algorithm described in Section 4.1.2, the general formula to compute detection rate is as follows:
Distribution of the Mutual Information: the attacker makes her decision by comparing the estimated mutual information, based on the sampled data, instead of actual mutual information based on the underlying probability. The effectiveness (i.e. the detection rate) of the attack therefore suffers if insufficient data is available. In the following, we will show how the amount of available trace data affects the detection rate of the attack. For this we will show how the estimated mutual information based on histograms of collected trace data affects Equations (6) and (7). We will also show that the attack is correct, that is, with sufficient trace data available the effectiveness of the attack approaches 100%. To calculate the detection rate by using (5), we need to obtain the probability distribution function of the mutual information estimationÎ (f, l) in (4). According to Hutter (2002) , for a sufficiently large sample size N ,Î (f, l) should satisfy a normal distribution. To obtain the distribution function, we therefore only need to estimateÎ (f, l)'s mean and variance, which are given in Lemmas 1 and 2, respectively. Their proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 1: The mean of the mutual information estimation I (f, l) is given by
where I (f, l) is the original mutual information, and r and s are defined in (1) and (2), respectively. As described in Equations (1) and (2) the value for r and s describe the range of possible sample values observed at the input and output ports, respectively. For 10 Mb/sec links, the maximum numbers of packets observed over a 10 msec interval could be about 10, giving rise to a value of 10 for r and s.
Lemma 2: The variance of the mutual information estimation
The constant C f,l is defined as follows
where p(a, b) is the original probability distribution of (a, b).
Detection rate theorem
Based on the distribution function of the estimated mutual information, we can calculate the detection rate by the following theorem. Its proof can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 1: For a mix with any number of output links, the detection rate, v, is given by
where N is the sample size, I (f, l M→R 1 ) is the mutual information of the input flow f and its corresponding output link aggregated flow l M→R 1 , N (0, 1) is the density function of the standard normal distribution, and C f,l M→R 1 is a constant. We can make a number of observations on Theorem 1.
• No assumptions are made in Formula (9) about the batching strategy of the mix or about the network topology. Theorem 1 is therefore valid for mix networks with arbitrary topology. Similarly, no assumption is about the type of traffic or about the amount of cross traffic. As a result, Theorem 1 is very general.
• Clearly, the detection rate is an increasing function of sample size N . Thus, when sample size N increases, the detection rate approaches 100%. This formally proves the intuitive fact that any mix network will fail and cannot maintain anonymity if the adversary has access to sufficient amount of traffic data.
Joint distribution of (a, b)
In Theorem 1, both constant C and the original mutual information I (f, l) depend on the joint distribution function p(a, b), which in turn is defined by the strategy of the mix network and the type and amount of traffic in the network. It can be estimated by two methods:
• Direct Estimation: that is, we can estimate p(a, b) directly from the time series J T defined in Equation (3). Specifically, from J T , a frequency distribution of (a, b) can be established. Then, we can use standard statistical techniques to obtain an estimation of p (a, b) . See Silverman (1986) for details.
• Estimation based on poisson assumption: the joint distribution p(a, b) can be calculated as follows:
To calculate the conditional probability p(b|a) in Equation (10), we need to apply proper queuing models in accordance to mixing strategies. For example, if the input flow is assumed to be a Poisson process, for a Simple Proxy S 0 , a M/D/1 queuing model should be used. For a Timed Mix S 2 , we should use an embedded Markov chain. Please see Appendices C and D for a detailed derivation of the probability from the models.
Evaluation
In this section, we assess the accuracy of methods we developed to estimate detection rate and to evaluate the performance of mix networks that are under flow-correlation attacks. We use the popular ns-2 network simulator (Canne and Floyd, 2004) for all the experimental evaluations.
Failure of mix network
Before we proceed to evaluate the accuracy of our predictive models for single mixes, we provide data to validate the claim made in Theorem 1: for any size of mix network, given sufficiently long data, flow correlation attack will ultimately achieve a detection rate of 100%. The network topology for this experiment is shown in Figure 3 : the senders and receivers are connected by a stratified cascade of 2n mixes. Each flow traverses n mixes to reach its receivers. Each link between mixes has a bandwidth of 10 Mbit/sec and propagation delay of 10 msec. The senders and receivers are connected to the mix network via links with bandwidth of 100 Mbit/sec and propagation delay of 1 msec. There are nine flows in the network: flow S 1 → R 1 , flow S 2 → R 1 , flow S 3 → R 2 , flow S 4 → R 5 , flow S 5 → R 6 , flow S 6 → R 3 , flow S 7 → R 4 , flow S 8 → R 7 and flow S 9 → R 8 , respectively. Flow S 1 → R 1 , flow S 2 → R 1 , and flow S 3 → R 2 traverse odd-numbered mixes only, flow S 8 → R 7 and flow S 9 → R 8 traverses even-numbered mixes only, flow S 4 → R 5 , flow S 5 → R 6 , flow S 6 → R 3 and flow S 7 → R 4 take the zigzag path between the two horizontal lines of the mixes, and flow S 1 → R 1 is the flow of interest to us. To ease the control of noise traffic rate, only flow S 1 → R 1 is TCP traffic from a FTP session and the other flows are UDP with Poisson arrival. The average traffic rate to all the receivers are adjusted to roughly five times the average rate of flow S 1 → R 1 . The mixes in network are all timed mixes with a batch interval of 10 msec. Figure 4 shows detection rate of a flow correlation attack for different numbers of mixes in the network. The length of sampling segments is set to be 10 msec. We make the following observations: 1 As stated in Theorem 1, the flow correlation attack is still effective when the network size is increased reasonably large. 2 In fact, the flow correlation attack achieves higher detection rates for larger mix networks! While we have not analysed this effect in detail, we conjecture that the reason is the loop-control mechanism of TCP: more mixes on the path, the larger burstiness of the TCP flow from Alice to Bob. In turn, this makes Alice's flow more recognisable compared with the background noise traffic. 
Estimation error of detection rate
In the last section, we derived Formula (9) to compute detection rate. This formula is an estimated one due to, at least, the following reasons:
• Error in Taylor Expansion: in Formula (AE3) (in Appendix A), the computation of mutual information is estimated by a Taylor expansion, which introduces certain error for limited number of terms.
• Error in p(a, b) computation: as discussed in Section 4.2.2, we introduce two different methods to estimate p (a, b) . Either one of them will contribute some error in the estimation of detection rate.
In this section, we would like to examine the accuracy of our estimation in order to ensure the performance data we derive in this paper are practically meaningful. We use the one-mix network setup in Figure 2 .
We define e, the estimation error of detection rate, as follows: e = |approximated detection rate − exact detection rate| exact detection rate (11) We obtain the exact detection rate in (11) by simulation. In all our experiments mentioned earlier, to prevent attacks based on analysing average traffic rates, traffic average rates on all output links are assumed to be the same. The traffic type of payload flow can be either UDP or TCP, with traffic rates of 100 and 80KBps bps, respectively. Compounded with noise traffic, each output link has an aggregated traffic rate 500 KBps. T , the length of sampling segments is set to be 10 msec. Figure 5 depicts the estimation error in terms of sample size. From this figure, we can make a number of observations:
• For all the traffic types and batching strategies, if the sample size is small (say, less than 100), the estimation error may be more than 5%. Fortunately, the estimation error diminishes and eventually approaches to zero when the sample size is sufficiently large. For example, when the sample size is 200, which corresponds to a sample of two seconds, the estimation error for all cases is below 4%. This observation suggests our estimation methods will be quite useful in practical situations.
• Generally speaking, the direct estimation method results in smaller error than the estimation by Poisson assumption. This is to be expected as the traffic on the Internet is not inherently Poisson (Paxson and Floyd, 1995) .
• In comparison with the networks using different batching strategies, the estimation errors appear to be similar. However, when we compare networks with different traffic types, the one with UDP traffic seems to result in less error. This is, perhaps, due to the difficulty in statistical modelling of TCP traffic. Figure 6 shows the detection rate in terms of sample size. We can make the following observations:
Detection rate
• In all cases (of different batching strategies and traffic types), the detection rate approaches to 100% when the sample size is sufficiently large. This demonstrates the challenges poised by flow-correlation attacks and validates the claim we made in Section 4.2.1.
• Even when the sample size is not too large (say, about 200), the detection rate can be relatively high, say, more than 90% for the shown cases.
• Implication of the above two observations is serious: a mix network would fail to provide anonymity under the flow-correlation attacks if the adversary is allowed to collect its sample for a time period of sufficient length. Note that, by using our formulae, a system designer can relatively precisely predict the situations where the failure may occur and invoke other countermeasures (such as shortening the flow life time, utilising channel hoping in wireless networks, etc.).
Minimum sample size
As mentioned earlier, a way to provide a countermeasure against flow-correlation attacks is to reduce the flow life time and hence, the adversary cannot obtain a sample that is sufficiently large. To provide some guidelines on this matter, we measure m, the minimum sample size needed in order for the adversary to achieve a given level of detection rate.
In Figure 7 , we compare the systems under the measure of the minimum sample size with different traffic type and batching strategies. A number of observations can be made from Figure 7 .
• In comparison of the cases with different detection rates, the higher detection rate requires larger minimum sample size. For example, in Figure 7 (a), for the case of TCP traffic, when the detection rate requirement changes from 95% to 99%, the minimum sample size increases from about 130 to almost 200. While this observation is expected, our formulae can provide useful guidelines for system parameter selection here.
• For UDP traffic, it seems that the batching strategy may not be effective in terms of the minimum sample size. In other words, the difference between Figure 7 (a) and (b) is not significant for the case of UDP traffic.
• However, effectiveness of batching appears to be much more interesting for the TCP traffic. We observe that the minimum sample size actually reduces when we switch the network from using no batching (S 0 ) to using batching strategy S 2 . That is, Figure 7 (a) shows that when a mix network does not use any batching and traffic is TCP, a sample of about 290 is required to achieve a detection rate of 99%, while in Figure 7 (b), we see that for a network that does use batching and has the similar rate of TCP traffic, the size of sample is reduced to 210 to achieve a detection rate of 99%. This is somehow against intuition: if sample size is a measure of the level of difficulty for an adversary, our data show that the adversary has more difficulties to achieve the required detection rate in a network without batching rather than with batching. This phenomenon actually can be explained. When batching is performed, the TCP traffic may start oscillation. Consequently, this oscillation seems to provide a much better signature for the adversary to make a recognition by correlating the traffic on input and output links. We believe this is an important discovery which justifies the necessity of our modelling and evaluation in this paper. We strongly suggest to always make a thorough evaluation for anonymity systems to be deployed.
Conclusion
We have analysed the anonymity of mix networks under flow correlation attacks. We present a formal model of the adversary and derived the detection rate as a performance measure of the system. Our theory discloses the underlying principle of flow-correlation attacks. As such, our results are the first to illustrate the quantitative relationship among system parameters, such as sample size, noise level, payload flow rate and detection rate. Our analysis quantitatively reveals that flow-correlation attacks (by performing correlation of flows into and out of a mix) can seriously degrade anonymity in mix networks. Consequently, our results also provide useful guidelines for the design of future anonymous systems where additional countermeasures must be taken. The work reported in this paper needs to be extended in a number of ways. The first obvious example is extension of the current work to mix networks. While Theorem 1 formally proves that any mix network is eventually bound to fail given sufficiently amount of data available to the adversary, we do not know yet how to predict the effectiveness of such networks for realistic traffic. Attention also needs to be paid during the modelling process on how the traffic travels in the super mix, as it will perform several aggregated batching procedures in addition to other traffic manipulations (such as delay and loss). As shown in Figure 4 , the interaction between TCP and sequences of mixes is subtle but has strong effect, while for single mixes, appropriate queuing models can be derived and inserted into the modelling framework. For mix networks, the modelling framework will need to be extended to account for TCP-level feedback. Furthermore, future studies are needed on more effective countermeasures against flow-correlation attacks. Possible candidates are control of flow life time, multipath routing and camouflaging. Finally, results in this paper and others (Kargupte et al., 2005) have repeatedly demonstrated that in many cases, simple and intuitive countermeasures in cyber security may not work as expected. A general theory should be developed to help system designers to quantify the security performance of the system and make proper design choices. Sherwood, R., Bhattacharjee, B. and Srinivasan, A. (2002) ' Substituting (AE3) into (AE3) and using properties of the multinomial distribution, we have, after rearrangements,
Lemma 2: The variance of the mutual information estimation I (f, l) is given by
where C f,l is a constant and is defined as follows
where p (a, b) is the original probability distribution of (a, b) .
Proof: To obtain the variance ofÎ (f, l), we perform an approximation by only keeping the first item in the Taylor expansion (AE3). Thus,
According to the definition, we knoŵ
Substituting (AE8) into (AE7), we havê
The multinomial distribution has the following property
where s a,b is a constant. Applying this property to (AE9) with
we have
Appendix B
In this appendix, we describe the major steps for proving Theorem 1. Proof: We know thatÎ (f, l) satisfies a normal distribution. Its mean and variance can be derived from Lemmas 1 and 2, respectively. Thus, the detection rate can be obtained by (5). Now, let us examine the distribution of the mutual information estimation. The mutual information estimation I (f, l M→R 1 ) between the input flow f and its corresponding output link aggregated flow l M→R 1 has the following normal distribution:
Since the input flow goes through link M→R 1 , it is easy to see that
where p(a, b) refers to the joint distribution of input flow f and its corresponding output link aggregated flow l M→R 1 .
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The mutual informationÎ (f, l M→R i ) (i = 1) between the input flow f and aggregated flow l M→R i has the following normal distribution:
where
If we assume that the input flow f is approximately independent of the output link aggregated flow l M→R i (i = 1), it is easy to see
That is, the mutual information estimationÎ (f, l M→R i ) (i = 1) degenerates into a constant (r − 1)(s − 1)/N . Now, we assume the same size N is sufficiently large and the mix's links have the same bandwidth, the detection rate formula (5) becomes
After some transformations, (AE15) becomes
queue, this case means that the output link bandwidth is not fully used and the number of output packets is greater than Alice's packets into the mix during the sampling interval, thus
2 b = C 1 : this case means that the output link bandwidth is fully used, thus
Now we determine the queue length distribution p(Q = q). Denote the noise packet arrival rate as λ N 1 , Alice's packet arrival rate as λ f and output link bandwidth as c 1 (C 1 = c 1 T , T is the sampling interval). From basic queuing theory, the equilibrium state queue length distribution of M/D/1 queue is:
Recalling that noise traffic packet count (P (N 1 )) and Alice's packet count (P (a) ) is Poisson distributed, we can get the joint distribution by substituting (AE20), (AE22), (AE22), (AE18) and (AE19) into (AE17).
Joint Distribution for flows f and l M→R i , i ≥ 2: Here we assume that Alice's flow f and the mix's output flows into receivers other than Bob are independent, thus Therefore
Clearly, p(b) can be easily got from the M/D/1 queue model if we assume that all traffic is Poisson and the average rate of traffic to receiver R i is λ N i . Denoting the maximum number of output packets to R i as C i and the corresponding link bandwidth as c i , we have two cases as above,
Noting that the noise traffic is Poisson distributed, the probability of queue length and the joint distribution can be easily got as above.
Appendix D
In this appendix, we derive the joint distribution of the input flow packet count a and the output flow packet count b for a timed mix. For a timed mix queue, our model is a little different from that of a simple proxy. In the deduction, we use a sampling interval equal to the period of the timed mix. Thus, packets queued in the current sampling interval will be served by the output link in the next sampling interval. In Figure A1 , we can see that the output flow packet count b and the input flow packet count a have a shift of one sampling interval and we denote the queue length Q as the number of packets queued exactly before the output link begins to process the packets. Thus, 
In equations (AE27) and (AE28), the terms related with noise traffic is easy to get since noise traffic is Poisson. Now we focus on the derivation of the queue-length probability.
Queue Model we model the queue using an embedded Markov chain. Denote P rs as the state transition probability matrix, where r is the current queue length exactly before the i th interval) and s the queue length exactly before the (i + 1) th interval. We consider two cases, (1) When r > C 1 , to move the state from Q = r to Q = s, there must be s − (r − C 1 ) packets coming during the i th interval as shown in Figure A1 . Then (2) When r ≤ C 1 , to move the state from Q = r to Q = s, there must be s incoming packets during the ith interval. Denoting k n as the probability that n packets coming in the i th interval, Figure A2 shows the state transition probability from the current state r to the next state s.
Thus, we have the following (L+1)×(L+1) transmission matrix, 
Thus, we can easily use the following equilibrium equations (AE30) and (AE31) to get the state probability. 
where I L+1 is a (L + 1) × (L + 1) identity matrix and 
The queue length distribution in (AE34) and (AE35) can be derived similarly as in (AE29) and (AE33).
